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Abstract — The prevalence and effectiveness of phishing 
attacks, despite the presence of a vast array of technical defences, 
are due largely to the fact that attackers are ruthlessly targeting 
what is often referred to as the weakest link in the system – the 
human. This paper reports the results of an investigation into 
how end users behave when faced with phishing websites and 
how this behaviour exposes them to attack. Specifically, the 
paper presents a proof of concept computer model for simulating 
human behaviour with respect to phishing website detection 
based on the ACT-R cognitive architecture, and draws 
conclusions as to the applicability of this architecture to human 
behaviour modelling within a phishing detection scenario. 
Following the development of a high-level conceptual model 
of the phishing website detection process, the study draws upon 
ACT-R to model and simulate the cognitive processes involved in 
judging the validity of a representative webpage based primarily 
around the characteristics of the HTTPS padlock security 
indicator. The study concludes that despite the low-level nature 
of the architecture and its very basic user interface support, 
ACT-R possesses strong capabilities which map well onto the 
phishing use case, and that further work to more fully represent 
the range of human security knowledge and behaviours in an 
ACT-R model could lead to improved insights into how best to 
combine technical and human defences to reduce the risk to end 
users from phishing attacks. 
Keywords — Phishing, website, security, psychology, human 
behaviour, cognitive modelling, ACT-R 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. Phishing attack effectiveness – targeting the human 
Phishing – a practice which tricks people into handing over 
their sensitive data to attackers [1] is an issue which the 
security industry is a long way from bringing under control. 
The effectiveness of such attacks is of particular concern, with 
the SANS Institute for example reporting that 95% of all 
breaches start with a phishing attack [2]. The key to their 
success is the fact that they exploit what is often referred to as 
the weakest link in the system – the human.  
Phishing attacks employ a combination of social 
engineering and “technical subterfuge” [3] to lure unsuspecting 
users to fake websites controlled by the attacker. These users 
often then fail to detect the sites as fake, resulting in them 
placing their trust in the site and entering sensitive information 
which can lead to significant harm both to individuals and 
organisations in such forms as financial loss, loss of intellectual 
property, damage to corporate reputation and identity theft. 
B. Countering the attack – traditional responses 
The security industry has traditionally sought to counter 
this threat primarily through the application of technical 
controls, and yet while technology can play a significant role in 
defence against such attacks, it cannot solve the problem alone. 
There are many debates over what the correct blend of ‘people, 
process and technology’ controls should be when seeking to 
counter a security threat [4], and yet it is clear that one cannot 
ignore the human element in seeking to prevent and detect 
phishing attacks. Industry’s response in this regard has been to 
deliver user education, training and awareness programs, often 
following well known standards such as ISO/IEC 27001 [5]. 
Researchers have been supporting such efforts for many 
years, with Computer Science and Psychology disciplines in 
particular contributing to increased understanding of, and 
solutions to, the problem of phishing attacks in society. But 
these disciplines, while each individually offering insights and 
solutions, are also now increasingly joining forces, with 
leading classic papers such as [6] and [7] strongly arguing for a 
more holistic approach to security risk management. 
C. The role of cognitive behaviour analysis 
One specific area in which the two fields have started to 
work together is the application of human cognitive behaviour 
research to the field of information security. Leading 
psychologists [8] have delivered significant advances in our 
understanding of the human mind, and have developed several 
mature, well-respected cognitive behaviour frameworks such 
as ACT-R [9] to model and predict human behaviour in a range 
of different environments. Within the security space, 
researchers have started to apply these frameworks to problems 
such as malware identification [10], but to date these do not 
appear to have been applied within a phishing context. 
This paper reports our investigation into how a computer 
model of cognitive behaviour might simulate human detection 
(or acceptance) of phishing websites. In particular, it considers 
how the ACT-R cognitive behaviour architecture framework 
and model could be applied to the problem and how, in doing 
so, we might gain a deeper understanding of how humans 
behave when faced with a phishing website and the limitations 
of our current approaches to combatting phishing attacks. 
II. UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DETECTION OF PHISHING 
WEBSITES – ATTACK VS. DEFENCE 
A. The attacker perspective 
To ensure an effective defence against threats to one’s 
assets and systems users are often advised to adopt the security 
mindset of thinking like the attacker [11]. This requires 
consideration of the end goal of the phishing attack and the 
potential strategies, options and constraints which might help 
or hinder the attacker in seeking to achieve this goal. 
1) The attacker’s goal: In preparing a phishing attack, the 
attacker is typically seeking to acquire sensitive information, 
such as passwords, personal data or credit card details. The 
goal may be fairly general in nature (e.g. “obtain as many 
credit card details as possible”), or it may be highly specific, 
targeting one or more individuals or organisations. In defining 
the goal of a phishing attack, the attacker may also wish to 
consider other factors, such as desired attack duration, or the 
level of resources, skills, time and finance available. 
2) Attack strategies: Having decided upon the goal of the 
attack, the attacker must then consider how this will be 
achieved. Phishing attacks have been described as relying on 
three main strategies: deception, diversion, and exploitation of 
lack of user knowledge [12]. All of these strategies follow the 
“carrot” approach in that they seek to convey a positive sense 
of trustworthiness to the end user. To these we should also 
consider the “stick” approach, in which techniques such as 
psychological manipulation are used to pressure the user into 
entering sensitive details out of fear that they may lose out 
should they fail to do so. 
3) Phishing website design options: The attacker must 
finally decide on how best to implement his or her strategy, 
leading to consideration of a number of phishing website 
design options. A wide range of techniques are available, such 
as: ensuring that the fake website is visually similar to the 
genuine website or manipulating the browser address bar to 
create the impression that the site is genuine (deception); use 
of distracting images and logos to draw the user’s attention 
away from indicators that may reveal the site to be fake 
(diversion); and domain name cheating, in which the attacker 
attempts to trick the user into believing that the domain 
namebelongs to the genuine website rather than the site 
controlled by the attacker (exploiting lack of user knowledge). 
4) Attacker limitations: The opportunities for tricking end 
users into submitting sensitive infromation into a phishing 
website are many and varied, and there is no simple way of 
guaranteeing that a given site is genuine or fake. Nevertheless, 
the attackers themselves are limited to the extent that they 
cannot develop phishing websites which will fool all end users 
all of the time. Given the right knowledge and applying the 
right behaviours, it is possible for end users to greatly increase 
their chances of detecting phishing websites, which can in turn 
help to tip the balance back away from the attacker. 
B. How users respond – human behaviour analysis 
The fact that phishing websites are specifically designed to 
deceive users and exploit their lack of attention and security 
knowledge stems from the attackers’ understanding of how 
users actually behave when interacting with websites. Indeed, 
as Adams and Sasse state: “hackers pay more attention to the 
human link in the security chain than security designers do” 
[6]. To redress this balance, researchers in the field such as 
Kirlappos and Sasse [13] suggested that it would be helpful to 
consider the entire decision-making lifecycle, from the point at 
which the user perceives and starts to pay attention to the 
website, through to their final decision as to whether or not to 
trust the site with their information. 
1) Perception and attention: When a user first views a 
website there are two principal, and different, processes at 
work: perception and attention. The user will initially perceive 
all the objects on the site (text, logos, images, etc.) within their 
field of vision, and will take in certain basic information – the 
user will not however really be looking at the site until he pays 
attention to a given object within this field of vision [8]. The 
challenge faced by users is that their attention is typically 
drawn to objects with highly vivid, salient features, and away 
from less salient, but more important security indicators 
elsewhere on the webpage. If this tendency is not overridden 
by sound security knowledge, users will be likely to fail to 
notice vital clues as to the validity or otherwise of the website. 
This is neatly illustrated in [14], with eye movement studies 
highlighting how expert users paid attention to objects of high 
security value such as an SSL padlock icon in the address bar, 
while novice users had their attention drawn instead to 
attractive, but irrelevant, logos in the content area of the page. 
2) Knowledge and learning: Having paid attention to the 
objects on the page, the user must then interpret them within 
the context of the core decision to be made: “is this site 
genuine?”. Whether the user correctly interprets the objects in 
this context depends upon what they know and have learned 
about their security values. Cranor again [15] made the point 
that security indicators are of limited use if users do not 
understand what they mean. 
And yet many users have low levels of security knowledge, 
failing to understand the role of the HTTPS padlock, or how to 
interpret a URL. Some of this confusion stems from a more 
general lack of IT and internet knowledge [12], while some is 
due to the complexity of the topic – URLs are not 
straightforward to understand. Many argue, however, that 
another root cause is the low quality and effectiveness of 
security education generally provided to users. 
3) Memory: Of course, even if users possess website 
security knowledge this is of limited value if they cannot 
remember it at the point of need. Psychologists often consider 
two types of memory – working memory, which is of limited 
capacity and which decays away within a few seconds, and 
long-term memory, which does not suffer from capacity issues 
but which cannot be retrieved easily [16]. The ability to 
retrieve and access knowledge from long-term memory is 
dependent upon factors such as how frequently the knowledge 
 is used, how recently it has been retrieved, and how the user 
was impacted by the use of this knowledge. Individuals who 
regularly practice applying their security knowledge are 
therefore more likely to be able to recall critical security 
knowledge than those who do so less frequently. 
4) External factors: Human responses in the face of a 
phishing attack can also be affected by a range of external 
factors, such as social engineering techniques [17] which seek 
to exploit the fact that humans typically make more errors 
when placed under time or social pressure, with a common 
example being the perceived need to enter credit card data 
quickly in order to acquire tickets online before an offer 
period expires. These factors are effective as they lead to an 
increase in cognitive workload which can in turn affect the 
user’s quality of judgement as to the site’s authenticity. 
5) Risk-based decision making: The above factors – 
perception of and attention to the website, the learning and 
retrieval of website security knowledge, and external factors 
such as time and social pressure – all combine to enable the 
user to make a judgement as to the level of trust which he or 
she feels can be placed in the site. The actual decision as to 
whether to enter sensitive information into the site, however, 
is a risk-based decision, in which the user has to determine 
whether the overall risk of providing the information is 
outweighed by the benefit of doing so. The risk component 
involves the traditional calculation Risk = Probability of 
Occurrence × Impact, which in turn requires an assessment of 
asset value (how sensitive is my information, and how useful 
is it to others?), the perceived level of threat to those assets, 
the levels of vulnerability within the site, and the potential cost 
to the user should the risk materialise. The benefit side to the 
equation, meanwhile, involves an assessment as to the 
potential gain associated with submitting information to the 
site. It is worth here reiterating the point made by Anderson 
[7] and Moore and Clayton [18] that users are not purely 
driven by security considerations, but by reward, and hence 
their decision-making process will take this into account. 
6) How people think – 2 systems: Despite what the above 
discussion may imply, user behaviour is of course an 
immensely complex process which does not even conform to a 
single “system” concept. Kahnemann [19] has argued that the 
brain operates 2 systems: System 1 aligns with our idea of 
“gut instinct”, making automatic, rapid, and effortless 
decisions and judgements based on educated guesses, rules of 
thumb, pattern recognition and heuristics. System 2, 
meanwhile, is described as “deliberate”, “effortful”, “slow”, 
and based on reason – this is the system which we might 
recognise as we find ourselves actually thinking hard about a 
problem, for example. Intuitively we can understand that both 
systems are used during the process of determining whether to 
trust a website, but which system is used at what stage and 
under what conditions is still far from being well understood. 
C. Modelling human behaviour – the ACT-R cognitive 
architecture 
The ACT-R cognitive architecture [20] is both a framework 
for human cognition and a model which is implemented in 
software using Lisp. The architecture reflects the modular 
structure of the brain, and represents a huge body of research 
into psychology and cognitive science. 
The architecture sets out, as shown in Fig. 1, a series of 
modules which relate to different regions of the brain; buffers 
through which the modules interact and exchange information; 
and productions which contain the rules which govern how the 
modules interact. These modules perform several roles: visual 
and motor modules simulate the brain’s interface with the 
external world; declarative and procedural memory modules 
deal with factual and procedural (rule-based) knowledge and its 
storage in memory; while the goal module keeps track of the 
end objective which the model is trying to achieve. 
The final component within the ACT-R model is its 
pattern-matching capability, which can change the state of the 
system by activating, or “firing”, different productions, which 
in turn apply rules to change the state of individual modules by 
modifying their buffers. In this way, the model can advance 
through a task from, for example, visual interpretation of a 
website through to manual confirmation of the decision as to 
the website’s validity. 
Fig. 1. How ACT-R works – illustrative example 
III. MODEL AND EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
A. Conceptual model 
To bring together the range of factors which influence 
human behaviour and decision-making in the face of a phishing 
attack, a high-level conceptual model was first developed. This 
model, whose scope was limited to the process of deciding on 
the validity of a given webpage, also served as an overarching 
framework for the more detailed modelling of the process 
within the ACT-R architecture, ensuring that the simulations of 
human behaviour were aligned to cognitive behaviour theory.  
The inputs to the model consist of initial base information, 
which enables core human attributes such as knowledge levels 
and risk appetites to be represented, and the representation of 
the candidate website and goal setting for the experiment, 
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namely “is the website genuine or fake?”. Given these inputs, 
the model then applies the core cognitive processes to arrive at 
a decision as to the trustworthiness of the site, before finally 
outputting the decision, which can then be compared with the 
actual status of the candidate website under consideration. 
This model, while prioritising the human cognitive 
behaviour processes, can also be seen to encapsulate the 
principal concepts and components of the security risk 
assessment process: valuation of the information assets at risk; 
assessment of that risk based on perceived threat levels; the 
phishing attack itself; the vulnerability of the user to the attack; 
and the controls in place to mitigate the risk, such as user 
training or the inclusion of the HTTPS padlock. These factors 
all combine to simulate the user making an overall residual risk 
calculation based on the probability of an attack occurring and 
the likely impact to the user in the event the attack does occur. 
B. ACT-R model design: HTTPS padlock 
This high-level logical model provides an appreciation of 
the various factors which influence a user’s decision as to 
whether to trust a website, but is purely theoretical in nature, 
and hence cannot be used to test the accuracy with which it 
reflects human behaviour; nor is it sufficiently detailed to 
predict how humans may respond, or how effectively, when 
confronted with a potential phishing website. It is therefore 
necessary to model the processes and interactions relating to 
human phishing website detection within software, and then 
define and run a series of experiments through the model 
whose results can be compared to those of actual human trials. 
As preliminary work to prove the concept, we decided to 
focus specifically upon modelling a basic website 
representation with a primary focus on the role of the HTTPS 
padlock. This selection supported the primary aims of the study 
since the padlock is present on all genuine HTTPS webpages 
(and not, generally, in fake ones) and hence can be used as a 
valuable indicator of webpage validity. It is also something 
which many users struggle to understand, verify, or even 
recognise, enabling the impact of user knowledge on the 
webpage validity decision to be investigated. The padlock’s 
key characteristics (presence/absence; location; colour; size; 
verifiability) are also relatively simple to model. Finally, some 
baseline reference data [14] was available to enable the 
model’s performance to be compared against some benchmark. 
The ACT-R HTTPS padlock sub-model design, as shown 
in Fig. 2, was developed to reflect the key conceptual model 
characteristics: 
 Webpage representation, in which a representation of 
a webpage is generated on a screen, upon which 
objects representing a security padlock icon and other, 
non-security icons are displayed 
 Determination of webpage characteristics, which 
enable a simulated user to characterise the webpage as 
genuine or fake based on the presence or otherwise of 
the representative padlock icon, the visual appearance 
of the icon, and the location of the icon on the screen 
 Pre-defined user knowledge levels, including the 
ability to draw upon and utilise different facts and rules 
relating to webpage security depending on the level of 
security knowledge of the end-user being modelled 
 Perception of the webpage and the objects on the 
screen, together with an ability to focus on (“attend 
to”) certain objects on the page 
 Access to, and storage of information in memory: 
specifically, the model’s ability to encode and store 
information perceived on the screen as well as retrieve 
factual and procedural (rule-based) security knowledge 
 Decision-making: the model design, to represent the 
human cognitive process, required the ability to apply 
procedural and factual knowledge using a pattern-
matching, rather than sequential, approach in deciding 
whether the candidate webpage is genuine or fake 
 Randomness, introduced to vary the selection and 
placement of the security padlock icon and other, non-
security, icons to prevent the model becoming 
deterministic and hence predictable in its outputs. 
Fig. 2. ACT-R padlock model design overview – expert user 
The decision-making requirement in particular reflects the 
need for the model to follow the ACT-R approach rather than 
that traditionally adopted computer model design. As a 
representation of the human mind, ACT-R is a complex yet 
powerful system – it has the ability to learn and remember 
facts, rules and strategies, and has been used in the study of a 
range of tasks covering perception and attention, language and 
communication and problem-solving and decision-making 
[21]. ACT-R is not, however, a linear tool and hence its 
instantiation in software is therefore noticeably different from 
more traditional software implementations. The modeler must 
therefore take this into account, set up the rules which ACT-R 
must obey and the conditions within which it must operate, and 
then let the model itself dictate the sequence of events. 
C. Experiment design 
Once the core model had been designed, a set of 
experiments were then needed to be defined to test the model’s 
effectiveness. Key requirements for the experiments included: 
the ability to vary the input parameters provided to the model 
during different experiments (for example to test the model’s 
effectiveness against different webpage representations or 
levels of user knowledge); the ability to compare the model’s 
output decision with the actual webpage validity status under 
 these different conditions; and the potential for future 
comparison between the model’s performance and that of 
actual end users when presented with the same conditions. 
To test the effectiveness of the model from a proof of 
concept perspective, while also seeking to simulate as 
realistically as possible an end user’s interaction with a 
suspected phishing website, three core experiments were 
considered, each building on the aims of the previous one. In 
each case, and for each trial run, a start state for the model was 
defined, setting initial conditions such as the level of user 
knowledge, the representation of the candidate webpage, and 
the model’s initial judgement to the webpage’s validity (set to 
“unknown”). The aim of each experiment was then to present 
the candidate webpage to the model, then set the model the task 
of judging whether the website was genuine or fake. 
1) Experiment 1: Phishing website detection performance 
– novice user: The aim of this experiment was simply to 
investigate how well the padlock model, together with a 
simulation of a novice user, would be able to represent a real 
end-user faced with a potential phishing website. For this 
experiment, the user knowledge level was set to “low”. 
2) Experiment 2: Low knowledge versus high knowledge: 
The aim of the second experiment was to introduce users with 
higher levels of security knowledge and then compare their 
performance with those of the novice users in the expectation 
that more highly skilled and knowledgeable users would 
perform better than novice users. This experiment sought both 
to determine the extent to which this might be the case, and to 
understand the factors which drive the model’s performance. 
3) Experiment 3: Effects of randomness: The aim of the 
third and final experiment was to test how the quality of user 
decision-making was affected by variations to the simulated 
user’s ability to recall (i) key factual security knowledge 
relating to the HTTPS padlock, and (ii) key rule-based 
security knowledge which guides the process of determining 
the webpage’s validity. In particular, the experiment sought to 
understand whether the role of randomness within the 
decision-making process (reflecting user distraction or 
forgetfulness, for example) could improve the realism of the 
model in simulating actual human behaviour. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION, RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. Core model and experiment development and testing 
Three versions of the model were developed during this 
study. The first version sought to demonstrate the core ability 
of the program to perceive a series of objects placed on a 
simulated webpage, to “test” the security attributes of these 
objects according to a set of rules contained within the model 
relating to the characteristics of the padlock, and to output a 
decision as to whether the webpage was genuine or fake. 
The first step was to build a basic representation of a 
webpage using the ACT-R window (an in-built function within 
ACT-R), onto which a series of textual objects were added as 
shown in Fig. 3. Some of these objects were placed at fixed 
locations, such as the URL, name of an imaginary bank owning 
the webpage, and a solid line indicating separation between the 
address bar and content Areas Of Interest (AOIs) of the 
webpage. Other objects, notably the single-letter objects, were 
placed randomly on the screen and subject to certain 
constraints, such as the placement of one of the (randomly 
selected) objects within the security icon AOI on the left-hand 
side of the address bar. 
Fig. 3. ACT-R ‘webpage’ with address bar security indicator representations 
Next, the base level of user knowledge was encoded. In this 
first version of the model, a low level of knowledge was 
assumed, so only basic (and incomplete, and sometimes even 
incorrect) facts regarding webpage security were provided to 
the model, namely: factual knowledge as to what an HTTPS 
padlock looks like (represented by a letter “X” in this model); 
the ability to recognise a padlock on the screen; and a rule-
based item of knowledge which simply stated that if a padlock 
is seen in the context AOI of the screen then the webpage is to 
be considered genuine and can be trusted. 
Note here that in the case of a novice user, the significance 
of the location of the padlock on the screen is not appreciated, 
reflecting the tendency for novice users to be attracted to logos 
suggesting website security even when such logos offer no 
security assurance. 
Once these initial model inputs had been encoded, the core 
cognitive processes were modelled. This was achieved by 
encoding a number of ACT-R procedures, each focusing on a 
different cognitive process, whether this be attending to an 
object perceived on the screen, storing new knowledge for 
future retrieval or use, or recalling factual or rule-based 
knowledge from memory in order to make a decision. 
The last component of the core cognitive model to be 
encoded was the command to the ACT-R manual model to 
confirm the decision by “pressing” a key to record the 
judgement as to whether the webpage is genuine (indicated by 
pressing the letter “Y”) or fake (the letter “N”). With this 
output the model is deemed to have completed its tasks, and 
hence the goal state is updated to “done”. At this point the 
experiment once again takes control, comparing the model 
output to the true status of the webpage to determine whether 
the model was successful in its judgement. 
With the coding of the model and the experiment 
completed, the following four scenarios were then defined to 
test both the ability of the model to function as expected and its 
performance in judging the webpage’s validity.  
 Scenario 1: user is presented with a genuine webpage 
(“X” in the security icon AOI) in which a padlock logo 
(“X”) is also displayed in the content AOI 
 Scenario 2: user is presented with a genuine webpage 
(“X” in the security icon AOI) but no padlock logo is 
displayed in the content AOI 
 Scenario 3: user is presented with a phishing webpage 
(no “X” in the security icon AOI) but one or more 
padlock logos are displayed in the content AOI 
 Scenario 4: user is presented with a phishing webpage 
(no “X” in the security icon AOI) and no padlock logo 
is displayed in the content AOI 
The experiment was then run multiple times, with a 
scenario selected randomly on each occasion, and the relevant 
webpage generated and presented to the model for analysis. 
The results of this initial experiment showed the model’s 
overall performance (phishing webpage detection success) to 
be low, with a success rate of only 38% in correctly 
determining the validity of the candidate webpage. Looking in 
more detail at the model’s performance in each of the above 
scenarios, it becomes clear that the (simulated) novice user’s 
inability to pay any attention to whether a padlock icon is 
displayed in the security icon AOI results in a decision-making 
process which is no better than guesswork. For example, a user 
will consider the webpage to be genuine if an “X” is perceived 
within the content AOI – this decision is correct if there also 
happens to be an “X” in the security icon AOI of the screen, 
but the correct decision is based on chance and luck rather than 
the application of security knowledge. Similarly, a user may 
correctly determine the webpage to be fake if he does not 
perceive a security logo in the content AOI and there is no 
security padlock icon within the security icon AOI. 
It was noted that the performance figures above were 
significantly lower even than the findings of the eye tracker 
experiment [14], which reported an average error rate of 32.4% 
among novice users attempting to determine website validity. 
Direct comparison between these figures is inappropriate, 
however, due to the differing conditions under which the 
experiments were run, not least the fact that the eye tracking 
experiments were based on presentation of 12 phishing 
websites and 8 genuine websites as opposed to the ACT-R 
model (16 phishing websites, 4 genuine). It would also be 
unwise, given the rather crude nature of this version of the 
model, to place too much importance on the above 
performance figures. Nevertheless, the results would seem to 
indicate that this version of the ACT-R model was, to some 
degree at least, broadly performing in a similar way to novice 
users when confronted with a potentially fake webpage and 
asked to make decisions based on little/no security knowledge. 
B. Improved search strategy: novice and expert users 
The principal aim of the second version of the model was to 
refine the initial program to better reflect the decision-making 
strategy of end users possessing greater knowledge of website 
security, and specifically those with knowledge of the security 
attributes relating to the SSL padlock and URL. 
Unlike novice end users, more expert users will typically 
focus on the address bar, rather than the content AOI, within a 
webpage to seek indicators relating to the webpage’s security. 
The productions within the model were therefore amended to 
reflect this improved factual and procedural knowledge. 
Initial testing of the revised model did, as expected, 
simulate the behaviour of advanced users focusing on the 
address bar AOI while determining whether the webpage was 
genuine, and on the basis of 100 trials the model achieved an 
overall success rate of 64%. On the occasions that the genuine 
padlock was displayed on the screen and the model focused on 
this object, the model correctly determined that the webpage 
was genuine. The model did not, however, focus on the 
padlock AOI in all cases, while in other trials the padlock was 
not present (indicating a fake website), and yet the model failed 
to correctly identify the webpage as such. 
Analysis of these results showed that running the 
experiment against the more knowledgeable “intermediate” 
model demonstrated marked improvement in the success rate 
compared with the novice user’s performance in version 1. 
Again, this is to be expected, since this model relies on the 
application of actual security knowledge rather than the novice 
user model’s mistaken belief in the value of security logos 
placed within the content AOI of the page. Interestingly, 
despite the absence of specifically defined randomness or 
“noise” within the model’s functionality, the model itself did 
not predict the webpage validity status accurately 100% of the 
time. Failures to detect genuine websites were attributed to the 
model perceiving other objects within the address bar AOI and 
therefore, like the novice model, basing its decision on 
irrelevant information. 
This version of the model however, despite simulating 
advanced user behaviour much more faithfully than version 1, 
still suffered from a number of limitations which prevented it 
from fully reflecting the way in which an expert user would 
apply his security knowledge to a webpage. Most significantly, 
an expert user would (unless highly distracted), be unlikely to 
completely ignore the presence or otherwise of a security logo 
in the security icon AOI of the address bar. In addition, an 
expert user would have applied his knowledge of genuine 
URLs to the URL seen on the screen in deciding upon how 
much to trust the webpage – while it is not known what 
weighting such users would typically apply to this decision, it 
is reasonable to assume that security indicators contained 
within the URL itself do carry some weighting, and hence the 
absence of this capability from the model is a limitation. It is 
therefore suggested that URL analysis be considered as a future 
enhancement to the model, and that this as a minimum should 
include analysis of the protocol (http / https) used. 
C. Introduction of probabilistic decision-making 
In reality of course, judgements as to a webpage’s validity 
are never based on 100% certainty but are rather risk-based in 
nature, with a user deciding that a given webpage is 
“sufficiently likely to be secure” to trust it with sensitive 
information. The aim of version 3 of the model was therefore 
to introduce an element of probability, and hence 
unpredictability, into how the simulated human would behave, 
so that the model can more accurately reflect, and predict, 
actual human performance. 
As discussed above, there are many factors in addition to 
the level of security knowledge which influence the decision-
making process. Critical to an end user’s ability to correctly 
identify a website as genuine or fake however is his ability to 
remember what he has learned about website security, and his 
ability to avoid distractions during the decision-making 
process. It was therefore decided to introduce both these factors 
into the model, utilising the probabilistic functionality within 
ACT-R to reflect the possibility that a user may on occasions 
either forget previously learned factual security knowledge or 
else fail to apply security rule-based knowledge correctly. 
1) Imperfect recall of factual knowledge: Within this 
version an element of distraction was introduced, so that the 
model would, on occasions, fail to “remember” the 
significance of the padlock when perceived on the screen. The 
degree to which the user is “distracted” was adjusted within 
ACT-R by varying the level of noise presented, with greater 
noise levels increeasing the likelihood that the fact would not 
be retrieved from memory. Analysis of the model’s 
performance with varying levels of noise revealed a slight 
downward trend as noise levels increased. This result aligns 
with expectations, with the simulated end user making more 
mistakes as the level of distraction increases. With very high 
levels of noise, however, the model continued to perform 
reasonably well, achieving a 70% success rate, suggesting that 
noise levels only have a certain level of impact on the quality 
of the model’s decision-making, and that beyond this level 
other factors become more significant. 
2) Imperfect application of rule-based knowledge: Rule-
based knowledge is applied within ACT-R through the use of 
the productions, which become candidates for activation, or 
“firing”, if the test conditions within the production are 
satisfied. If multiple productions meet a given set of test 
criteria, then ACT-R will select one of these productions to 
fire based on their utility – a parameter which each production 
possesses and which is used by ACT-R during conflict 
resolution between productions [22]. Version 3 of the model 
used this functionality to introduce a small element of 
probability that expert users would look in the content AOI for 
security indicators rather than the address bar AOI. The 
introduction of this imperfect application of rule-based 
knowledge was expected to result in a slight reduction in the 
expert user model’s effectiveness, with its performance 
decreasing steadily with the corresponding decrease in correct 
application of the rule. On the occasions that the trial included 
a large degree of noise this result was achieved, successfully 
demonstrating the concept of user perception and attention 
being affected by noise in the system “distracting” the user 
from applying the rule-based security knowledge which he 
would apply had the distractions not been present. However. 
this behaviour within the model was displayed at a cost, 
namely a significant increase in time spent by the model in 
attempting to reach its decision, and a significant reduction in 
the model’s overall performance, which was assessed to be 
associated with the noise affecting the whole model, and not 
simply those target productions. 
V. DISCUSSIONS 
A. Applicability to the phishing attack and detection process 
The ACT-R architecture, and its instantiation in software, 
delivers significant capabilities in the realm of human cognitive 
behaviour modelling which are highly applicable to the 
phishing website context, and indeed across the full phishing 
attack lifecycle. The core ACT-R functionality used in the 
HTTPS padlock model for example – perception and attention, 
knowledge and memory, problem-solving and decision-
making, and motor-based confirmation of decision – delivered 
a simulation of human behaviour which was fully recognisable 
as reflecting the way in which both novice and expert users 
would behave throughout a security scenario. 
B. Cognitive modelling capabilities 
While some of the core cognitive modelling capabilities 
within ACT-R were successfully applied to the proof of 
concept phishing scenario within this study, a review of the 
ACT-R reference manual [22] also reveals a wide range of 
capabilities which were unused in the specific design 
implementation but which would deliver great value if 
incorporated within future models of human phishing detection 
– ACT-R’s ability to learn, for example, could enable 
simulation of a process by which users are trained to recognise 
phishing websites and receive feedback on their performance to 
improve their overall ability. 
C. User interface / interoperability 
Less positively, and because of its low-level nature and 
basic user interface, it would not appear to be a straightforward 
task to provide an actual webpage as input to the model. The 
inability of the ACT-R visual module to perceive and attend to 
objects within an actual webpage rather than a crude 
representation of a webpage was an unwelcome limitation of 
the overall model. 
D. URL modelling 
It is also considered that the model would have been greatly 
enhanced had it included not only the HTTPS padlock 
functionality but also a more realistic simulation of user 
interaction with URLs. A high-level design for this component 
of the model was produced, and a sample URL included within 
the representative webpage with the components of the URL 
(protocol, domain name, parameter list) represented as different 
objects within ACT-R. However, it became apparent that the 
core model was unable to interpret the URL as separate 
objects, instead focusing on individual letters or symbols in a 
way which was not representative of human behaviour. The 
model’s functionality did not extend to interpretation and 
application of knowledge to the objects within the URL as 
perceived by the model, and hence the overall effectiveness of 
the model was limited. Incorporation of robust URL 
perception, knowledge/memory retrieval and problem-solving 
functionality within the model would be a valuable piece of 
future research, since this could be combined with the model’s 
analysis of the HTTPS padlock to deliver significantly more 
advanced decision-making capabilities. 
E. User benchmarking 
Finally, although not a limitation of the ACT-R model, the 
failure to identify any research reporting the results of user 
phishing detection trials which mirrored the experiments within 
this study meant that it was not possible to draw any 
meaningful conclusions regarding the model’s accuracy. The 
results from the study did broadly align with what might be 
expected from actual end users, and the priority for the study 
was to develop a proof of concept model rather than develop 
highly accurate predictions of actual end user behaviour. 
Nevertheless, further refinement of the model and greater 
experimentation to enable further analysis of model 
performance would have been of value. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has investigated how one of the most complex 
parts of the security system – the human – interacts with one of 
the most prevalent and effective forms of attack – phishing. In 
doing so it has identified a significant opportunity to build on 
previous research in this space to gain still greater insights 
through the application of the ACT-R cognitive architecture. 
The study has found that despite the low-level nature of the 
architecture and basic user interface, ACT-R possesses strong 
capabilities which map well onto the phishing use case, and 
that future research could usefully build on this initial proof of 
concept model. Suggested lines of development include: 
refining the current “proof of concept” HTTPS padlock sub-
model to better exploit ACT-R’s functional capabilities and 
improve overall model performance; improving the interface 
between ACT-R and websites to enable actual websites to be 
presented to the model; extending current model capabilities by 
incorporating additional security indicators and simulating 
additional user behaviours; comparing the ACT-R model’s 
performance with real user trials; and expanding the scope of 
the model to encompass the entire phishing attack cycle. 
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